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THE FDIC'S ENHANCED POWERS OVER SAVINGS
ASSOCIATIONS: DOES FIRREA MAKE IT "SAIF'?
INTRODUCTION
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA") ' was enacted to reform bank and savings association
regulation in the wake of the savings association crisis.2 FIRREA dra-
matically altered the fundamental regulatory structure of the savings as-
sociation industry, popularly known as the Savings and Loan ("S&L")
industry, and marked a reversal of the trend toward liberalizing the pow-
ers of the savings associations begun in the early 1980s by the Reagan
Administration.'
One of FIRREA's major features is the regulatory restructuring of the
S&L industry under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"). 4 Pursuant to FIRREA, the FDIC has retained its traditional
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified at various sections of 12
and 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FIRREA].
2. See Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned Statutory Owrview of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, in Annual Survey
of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59
Fordham L. Rev. 5323 (1991). FIRREA has made "savings association" a term of art to
encompass "(A) any Federal savings association; (B) any State savings association; and
(C) any corporation (other than a bank) that the Board of Directors [of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation] and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
jointly determine to be operating in substantially the same manner as a savings associa-
tion." FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(b)(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 190 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(b)(b)(1)). FIRREA also defines the term "Federal Savings Association" to mean
"any Federal savings association or Federal savings bank which is chartered under sec-
tion 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act" and "State Savings Association" to mean
"(A) any building and loan association, savings and loan association, or homestead asso-
ciation; or (B) any cooperative bank (other than a cooperative bank which is... organ-
ized and operating according to the laws of the State.. . ." FIRREA. supra note 1,
§ 204(b)(b)(2), (b)(3), 103 Stat. at 190-91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(2),
(b)(3)).
Although FIRREA's scope also includes commercial banks and bank holding compa-
nies, this Note will be limited to a discussion of the FDIC's powers over savings
associations.
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 86, 87 [hereinafter House Report No. 54]. "President Reagan
promised the American people he would reduce government regulation because 'it was
hampering private initiative and impeding the functioning of the market.' .. . The lack of
adequate supervision and examination of thrifts was one of the primary causes of the
thrift crisis." House Report No. 54, supra, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 86, 97.
4. See House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 309, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, at 105. The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933 to insure
federally chartered commercial banks. See Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 8, 48 Stat.
162 (1933). The FDIC was established to limit banking powers, expand federal regula-
tory powers and insure commercial bank deposits in the event of bank insolvency. White,
Introduction to the Banking Law Symposium: A 200 Year Journey from Anarchy to Oli-
garchy, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 1059, 1061 (1989). The FDIC now manages the Bank and Sav-
ings Association Insurance Funds and insures commercial bank and savings association
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roles as deposit insurer, supervisor of state-chartered non-Federal Re-
serve member banks and liquidator of failed federally insured institu-
tions.' FIRREA also substantially strengthens and expands the FDIC's
powers over savings associations from the supervisory and enforcement
powers of the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"). 6
Despite the FDIC's enhanced powers to implement FIRREA's goals,7
"members of the 101st Congress - many are calling it the Hundred and
Worst -. ... [have failed] to provide adequate funding for closing failed
S&Ls .... The failure to act could 'increase the cost of the bailout by
billions and billions,' by keeping money-losing S&Ls open." 8 Although
it is undisputed that FIRREA grants the FDIC extensive regulatory
powers over savings associations, the extent and the effect of the FDIC's
new powers are being questioned.9
This Note will address the powers that FIRREA gives to the FDIC
over savings associations. Part I will briefly explain the structure of sav-
ings association and banking regulation before the enactment of FIR-
REA. In addition, Part I will identify the new powers and
responsibilities over savings associations that FIRREA grants to the
FDIC. Part II will examine the FDIC's management of savings associa-
tion insurance via the Savings Association Insurance Fund ("SAIF").
Part III will analyze the FDIC's regulation of savings associations under
FIRREA. This Note concludes that the FDIC's newly acquired author-
ity over savings associations is ineffective due to insufficient funds to cure
the problems in the S&L industry.10
deposits up to $100,000 per account. See Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms 235-36
(1990).
5. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 205(1)(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 194 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1814(a)(1)).
6. See House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 310-11, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 106-07; Clark, Murtagh & Corcoran, Regulation of Savings
Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, 45 Bus. Law. (ABA) No. 3, 1013, 1026 (May 1990) [hereinafter Regulation of
Savings Associations]. "The primary purposes of [FIRREA] are to recapitalize the de-
posit insurance fund for savings associations, to provide for the resolution of the out-
standing and anticipated failures of savings associations, and to improve the regulation of
savings associations so as to prevent future insolvencies." Id. at 1015. FIRREA has
given the FDIC a major role in accomplishing these objectives. Prior to FIRREA, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") was responsible for insur-
ing savings association deposits and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
was responsible for savings association regulation. See National Housing Act, §§ 402-
405, 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1988).
7. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1015.
8. Fund, Who Drove the S&L Getaway Car?, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1990, at CI, col.l.
9. See Garten, What Price Banking Failure?, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 1159, 1159-62 (1989).
10. Once again, "Congress adjourned without providing additional funds for the sav-
ings and loan bailout, in a striking demonstration of how big a political albatross the
hugely expensive bailout has become." Duke, Congress Fails to Provide More Funding
For S&L Bailout Raising Threat to RTC, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at C19, col. 1. In
March, 1991, the Senate finally approved a bill for $78 billion for the Resolution Trust
Corporation to continue to cleanup the savings association mess, but the cleanup is still
"vastly unpopular." Thomas, Senate Approves $78 Billion Measure For the Cleanup of
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I. THE PRE-FIRREA STRUCTURE AND AN INTRODUCTION TO
FDIC'S ENHANCED ROLE UNDER FIRREA
A. The Pre-FIRREA Structure
In the pre-FIRREA world of banking, the federal banking regulatory
agencies had fairly distinct jurisdictional responsibilities. Congress had
carefully apportioned regulatory and supervisory responsibility for the
"safety and soundness"'" of federal and state banks and of savings as-
sociations by assigning chartering and supervisory powers to various fed-
eral agencies.
Congress assigned responsibility for banks and savings associations as
follows: chartering and supervising of national banks to the Comptroller
of the Currency;12 state Federal Reserve member banks, bank holding
companies and their non-bank "sisters" to the Federal Reserve Board; 3
federally chartered and state non-Federal Reserve member banks to the
FDIC;14 and federally chartered and state non-Federal Reserve member
savings associations to the FHLBB and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). 5
Ultimately, the FDIC gained substantial power over many state banks
that were not otherwise subject to the Federal Reserve or to the Comp-
troller's regulation."6 Although state banks were not required to insure
their deposits, these banks were at a competitive disadvantage in the mar-
ketplace if they did not insure because consumers typically demand de-
posit insurance. Once they obtained deposit insurance from the FDIC,
state banks became subject to FDIC regulation.' 7
The FDIC was responsible for insuring the deposits of commercial
Insolvent Thrifts, Wall St. J., March 20, 1991, at A2, col. 1. It is estimated that the total
cost of the cleanup will exceed $200 billion, even without the billions in interest that will
be added. See idL If Congress continues such delays in approval of the necessary funding,
this "narrow refinancing measure" will be grossly insufficient to pay for the cleanup. Id
at col. 2.
11. "Safety and soundness" is defined as a general objective of federal banking regula-
tion. "Federal and state supervision of banking is designed to provide a financially stable
industry that meets the public's credit and other financial needs, as well as to prevent
RUNS or PANICS by providing depositors with assurances that their funds will be pro-
tected from loss." Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms 539 (1990); see also Regulation
of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1026 ("[T]he FDIC is authorized to examine any
savings association and its affiliates in order to ensure the safety and soundness of the
association.").
12. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 1814(b) (1988); Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself.
Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St.
LJ. 1117, 1119 (1989).
13. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 1814(b); Malloy, supra note 12, at 1120.
14. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814(b)-(c), 1815(a); Malloy, supra note 12, at 1120.
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988); Malloy, supra note 12, at 1120.
16. White, supra note 4, at 1061.
17. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(h), (q)(3) (1988). Cf. § 1818(b)(1) (1988) (any insured bank
is subject to termination if FDIC determines it is engaging in unsafe or unsound prac-
tices); White, supra note 9, at 1061 (inferred from fact that power of federal regulators
over state banks was increased by the creation of the FDIC).
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banks while the FSLIC was responsible for insuring savings associa-
tions."8 Congress intended the FDIC and FSLIC to function as in-
dependent deposit-insurance companies whose premium collections from
commercial banks and savings associations would cover losses in the
event that individual institutions failed. 19 In 1988, the FSLIC became
insolvent because of the expense incurred in rescuing failed thrifts.2"
Congress eventually responded to the crisis by passing FIRREA to bol-
ster the regulatory and supervisory powers of the federal regulators.21
B. FDIC's Enhanced Role under FIRREA
The FDIC's new responsibilities and powers over savings associations
under FIRREA include the following: (1) administering the SAIF;22
(2) liquidating the assets of failed savings associations (previously held
by the now-defunct FSLIC) through the newly established FSLIC Reso-
lution Fund;23 (3) liquidating the assets of failed savings associations af-
ter 1992;24 (4) controlling the activities of savings associations;2"
(5) monitoring new capital requirements for savings associations;26 and
(6) managing the newly established Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC,,). 27
18. This separation of powers was deemed necessary when these agencies were cre-
ated because of the striking differences between commercial banks and savings associa-
tions. Today, housing control over deposit insurance for both types of institutions under
the FDIC alone makes more sense as the differences between commercial banks and sav-
ings associations have fallen away. See sources cited supra note 4.
19. See P. Nadler, Commercial Banking in the Economy 21 (1986).
20. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1013-14 & nn. 5 & 12.
21. See id. at 1015; White, supra note 9, at 1063; Note, Too Many Consonants and
Not Enough Consonance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfigura-
tion, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S263 (1991).
22. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 205(1)(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 194-95 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1814(a)(2)).
23. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 253 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821a(a)(1)).
24. See id; see also Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and
The S&L Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L
Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S339 (1991) (discussion of the
RTC's responsibilities for liquidating failed savings associations after the enactment of
FIRREA and prior to 1992). In 1992, the FDIC will take over responsibility for failed
savings associations handled by the RTC.
25. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222, 103 Stat. at 269-73 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831e).
26. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(a)(m), 103 Stat. at 343-44 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(m)). The "Qualified Thrift Lender Test" under the above section grants
discretion to the FDIC to monitor savings association investments and apply exceptions
and restrictions to these requirements it deems necessary in the circumstances. Id.
27. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(a)(b)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)); Barth, Benston & Wiest, The Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Description, Effects and Implications, 13 Issues in Bank
Reg. (Bank Admin. Inst.) No. 3, at 5 (Winter 1990) [hereinafter Description, Effects and
Implications]; see also Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and
The S&L Crisis, supra note 24, at S343 (discussing the RTC).
S384 [V/ol. 59
FDIC'S ENHANCED POWERS
FIRREA apportioned the FSLIC and the FHLBB's former powers
and responsibilities between the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and
the FDIC.2" Pursuant to FIRREA, the FDIC is now responsible for all
aspects of insuring accounts, providing financial assistance to prevent de-
fault, and administering the SAIF.2 9 In addition, the FDIC inherited
responsibility for those FSLIC and FHLBB rules and regulations gov-
erning the conduct and powers of conservatorships and receiverships.' °
More specifically, under certain conditions, the FDIC has the power to
appoint itself sole conservator or receiver of an insured state savings
association.3'
Although it is clear that FIRREA has enhanced the powers of the
FDIC, the extent of the FDIC's authority is unclear.32 Since FIRREA's
enactment, courts and scholars have questioned the FDIC's powers over
savings associations. 33 The FDIC's most important and controversial
functions regarding savings associations include its administration of
SAIF,34 its powers as conservator/receiver," its emergency powers,36
and its regulation of savings association activities and capital require-
ments.37 The FDIC is constantly experimenting with new approaches to
resolve the savings association crisis.38 It is therefore necessary to review
the FDIC's powers under FIRREA in light of current conditions in the
28. See Allocation of Regulations and Orders Pursuant to the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 54 Fed. Reg. 41,359 (1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. chs. III, V) [hereinafter Allocation of Regulations]. For a discus-
sion of the responsibilities of the OTS, see Note, The Office of Thnrift Supervision, in An-
nual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S363 (1991).
29. See Allocation of Regulations, supra note 28, at 41,359.
30. See id.
31. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(a)(c)(1),(4), 103 Stat. at 222-23 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1),(4)).
A conservator is charged with protecting the assets of a troubled bank or savings asso-
ciation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988). See also Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms 142
(1990) (conservator is an "official appointed by a banking regulator to protect the assets
of a troubled bank or savings institution while a permanent solution to its financial
problems is worked out. A bank declared to be insolvent is placed under control of a
RECEIVER, and assets sold to pay its creditors.").
32. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1153.
33. See, e.g., FDIC v. Gillard, 740 F. Supp. 427, 428 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("Numerous
post-FIRREA decisions recognize implicitly ur explicitly that the FDIC succeeds to the
rights of the FSLIC with respect to receiverships created prior to enactment."); see also
Garten, supra note 9, at 1163-64 (questioning FDIC's new powers under FIRREA);
Mitchell, The New Savings and Loan Bailout Bill, N.Y.LJ. at 6, col. 6 (Sept. 27, 1989)(same).
34. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(4), (3)(6), 103 Stat. at 218-19 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4), (a)(6)).
35. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212, 103 Stat. at 222 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821).
36. See FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 901, 902, 903, 103 Stat. at 446-57 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818(b) and 12 U.S.C. 1818(e)(1) respectively).
37. See FIRREA, supra note I, § 222, 103 Stat. at 269-73 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 183 le); Malloy, supra note 12, passim.
38. See Garten, supra note 9, at 1163 n.24. The technical changes made to the
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savings association industry. The scope of the FDIC's influence on the
savings association industry is demonstrated most dramatically by its
management of the SAIF and its regulation of savings association
activities.
II. THE SAVINGS ASSOCIATION INSURANCE FUND
Although FIRREA created new regulatory agencies with extensive
powers, one of the Act's most striking aspects was its restructuring of the
FDIC.39 As part of the FDIC restructuring, FIRREA mandated a sub-
stantial reorganization of the regulation and insurance of savings
associations.'
A. Dissolution of FSLIC
The House Report accompanying FIRREA stated: "It is the objective
of the Congress and the Administration to maintain separate federal de-
posit insurance funds. Both the commercial bank and thrift deposit in-
surance funds will be under the control of the FDIC.' 4 1 FIRREA thus
dissolved the FSLIC and made the FDIC the sole administrator of the
federal deposit insurance system.42 Since FIRREA's passage, the FDIC
controls two newly created and separately maintained insurance funds-
the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF"), 43 which collects deposit insurance
premiums to cover commercial bank insolvencies, and the SAIF, which
collects deposit insurance premiums to cover savings association
insolvencies."
The FDIC is also responsible for managing the FSLIC Resolution
Fund, 5 which FIRREA established to house all the FSLIC's assets and
liabilities as of August 8, 1989. Congress intended the FDIC to "man-
FDIC's powers under FIRREA did nothing to alter the FDIC's experimental approaches
to savings association failures. See id.
39. See Note, The Office of Thrift Supervision, in Annual Survey of Financial Institu-
tions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev.
S363 (1991); Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and The S&L
Crisis, supra note 24, at S343; FIRREA, supra note 1, § 201, 103 Stat. at 187-88 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811).
40. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 202, 103 Stat. at 188 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811(1)).
41. House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 310, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News, at 106.
42. See Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3.
43. See Note, A Note to Congress and the FDIC After FIRREA, Where's the BIF, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S411 (1991).
44. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(4), 103 Stat. at 218-19 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)); Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3; infra note
53 and accompanying text.
45. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 252-53 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821a(a)(1)).
46. See id., § 215(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 253 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821a(a)(2)(A)).
S386 [Vol. 59
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age the FSLIC Resolution Fund to obtain some of the funding needed in
connection with insolvencies of FSLIC-insured savings associations re-
solved prior to January 1, 1989.",17
Although the FDIC manages the FSLIC Resolution Fund, FIR.REA
prohibits consolidation of the FSLIC assets and liabilities transferred to
the FDIC with the other FDIC assets (Le., any SAIF assets).4" Because
the FSLIC Resolution Fund is required to pay fees into the SAIF for
supervisory and administrative expenses, 49 however, such fees will neces-
sarily be commingled with current FDIC assets.so The FSLIC Resolu-
tion Fund will be dissolved when all associated debts and liabilities have
been satisfied and all assets sold.5" Moreover, any judgment or legal pro-
ceeding commenced against the FDIC involving the FSLIC or the
FSLIC Resolution Fund will be limited to the assets held in the FSLIC
Resolution Fund.52
B. Creation of SAIF
Pursuant to FIRREA, the FDIC has shouldered the responsibilities of
the now-defunct FSLIC and thus manages the SAIF, which FIRREA
created to replace the FSLIC.53 The SAIF insures deposits in savings
associations up to $100,000 per account' and protects depositors at ap-
proximately 2,800 savings associations." FIRREA also compels the
47. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1025. "The FDIC will
obtain funding from the SAIF for the resolution of any insolvencies of savings associa-
tions that were not insured by the FSLIC or for which a conservator or receiver is ap-
pointed after August 9, 1992." Id at 1026.
48. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215(a)(3), 103 Stat. at 253 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821a(a)(3)).
49. See id, § 215(a)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 253 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 182la(a)(2)(B)); Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1024-25.
As of FIRREA's effective date, August 9, 1989, the FSLIC Resolution Fund became
liable for fees assessed to be paid into the SALE. See FIRREA. supra note 1,
§ 215(a)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 253 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821a(a)(2)(B)).
50. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(4), 103 Stat. at 218 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1821a(b)(3)-(4) and 1821a(b)).
51. See id, § 215(f), 103 Stat. at 254 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821a(f)).
52. See id, § 215(d), 103 Stat. at 254 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821a(d)).
53. See id, § 211(3)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(3)(6)(A)).
54. See id, § 211(1), 103 Stat. at 218 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)).
55. See FDIC Names Members of SAIF Committee to Offer Advice on Deposit Insur-
ance, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 110 (Jan. 22, 1990) [hereinafter FDIC Names
Members].
FIRREA mandates that the logo used by SAIF-member savings associations contain a
statement that insured deposits are "backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States Government... [accompanied by a] symbol of an eagle." FIRREA, supra note I,
§ 221(a)(1)(A) and (C), 103 Stat. at 266. This is different from the traditional FDIC logo
that banks are entitled to display. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(a)(2), 103 Stat. at
266.
Although SAIF-insured svings associations are technically insured by the FDIC,
many commentators, including the American Bankers Association, objected strenuously
to an FDIC proposal to permit savings associations to advertise themselves as "FDIC-
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SAIF Advisory Committee 6 to meet with the FDIC quarterly to discuss
business conditions, regulations and any other issues regarding SAIF-
insured savings associations.57
C. Membership in SAIF
In general, savings associations are members of SAIF because those
"that were insured by [the FSLIC] on August 8, 1989, the day before the
date of enactment of FIRREA... became 'automatically' insured by the
FDIC by operation of law."5" Federal and state savings associations not
insured on or before August 8, 1990 must now apply directly to the
FDIC for deposit insurance.59 Also, savings associations insured by
SAIF must file an application with the FDIC for authorization to merge
with non-insured institutions.6°
"From New Jersey to Texas to California, savings and loan institu-
tions are trying to get state laws enacted that would allow them to con-
vert into savings banks. ' 61 Such conversions may require a switch in
insured." See Commercial Banks Decry 'FDIC-Insured' Claims by Thrifts, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 216, at A-6 (Nov. 9, 1989) (WESTLAW, BNA Library, DER
File) [hereinafter Commercial Banks].
FIRREA does, in fact, bar savings associations from displaying the FDIC logo, but
does not address the description "FDIC-insured." See FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 221(l)(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 266. SAIF-insured institutions consider the logo distinction
between savings associations and banks as "foster[ing] the idea that deposit insurance
provided by SAIF is not as good as... [bank insurance] protection." Commercial Banks,
supra, at A-6. Washington Federal Savings Bank has skirted the debate by displaying a
decal reading "all accounts insured by the FDIC." FDIC to Consider Solutions to
"FDIC-Insured" Dispute, 14 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor) No. 13, at 6 (April 2,
1990) [hereinafter FDIC to Consider Solutions].
This controversy is expected to continue until the FDIC clarifies what savings associa-
tions may and may not do to attract deposits. FDIC to Consider Solutions, supra, at 6
(April 2, 1990).
56. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 226, 103 Stat. at 276 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831h(31)(a)). The SAIF Advisory Committee is comprised of an eighteen-member
board, one member elected from each of the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks and six
members appointed by the FDIC to represent the public interest. See id., § 226(b), 103
Stat. at 276 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831h(31)(b)(l)-(2)).
57. See id., § 226(f),(g), 103 Stat. at 276 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831h(31)(f),(g)); see also FDIC Names Members, supra note 55, at 110 (SAIF Advi-
sory Committee "directed by law to meet four times a year to confer with the FDIC").
58. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Am. Banker, Oct. 4, 1989, at 8; see also
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(14), 103 Stat. at 213-14 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(1)(2), (1)(3)(B) (discussing fund eligibility).
59. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(1),(a)(4)(2), 103 Stat. at 195 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(I)-(2)).
60. See 56 Fed. Reg. 1126, 1137 (1991); Interim In-Out Fees Set for SAIF BIF; FDIC
Limits Activity of State Thrifts, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 923 (Dec. 18, 1989)
[hereinafter Interim In-Out Fees].
61. Wayne, S&L's Seek State Charters, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at Dl, col. 6. A
state savings bank differs from a savings association in that it offers a mixture of commer-
cial banking and thrift activities. See Comment, supra note 2; DiNuzzo, Some Thrifts
Converting into State Savings Banks, Am. Banker, Aug. 10, 1990, at 4. Further, state
"[s]avings banks can engage in such practices, which were prohibited for savings and
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membership between insurance fmds.6 2 Since FIRREA's enactment,
some states have allowed federal and state savings associations to convert
their charters to state savings bank charters.63 Now that all federally
insured savings associations are insured by the FDIC through SAIF,
state-law requirements that an institution be FDIC-insured in order to
become a savings bank are no longer an obstacle to charter conversions.6
Accordingly, charter conversions, and the resulting switches from SAWF
to BIF insurance coverage, have become more attractive to SAF-insured
associations.65
Some federal regulators view these conversions as attempts to evade
strict new federal laws.66 However, L. William Seidman, chairman of the
FDIC, does not perceive "charter flips" as attempts to circumvent the
law, but merely as attempts to avoid "'very costly, noncompetitive' as-
sessments."'67 Mr. Seidman maintains that the FDIC, whose supervision
and regulation cannot be escaped via "charter ffips," sufficiently controls
the post-conversion institutions and that OTS supervision constitutes an
unnecessary expense.68
Moreover, "[b]y switching to a savings bank charter, the S&Ls will be
able to get around the more restrictive lending rules mandated by...
loans by the 1989 bailout law." Wayne, supra. These activities include the authority to
own interests in real estate projects, to purchase "junk bonds" and to extend large loans
to a single borrower. See id.
62. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(d)(2), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 58, at 8; Note, A
Note to Congress and the FDI" After FIRREA, Where's the BIFP, supra note 43, at S416.
63. "At least seven states have adopted or are considering legislation to permit feder-
ally and state-chartered S&Ls to convert to a more lucrative and less costly state savings
bank charter .... " Thrifts Turn to Savings Bank Charters to Avoid High Cost of Supervi-
sion, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 296 (Aug. 20, 1990).
64. See DiNuzzo, supra note 61, at 4.
65. It is important to note that "[t]he conversion of a SAIF member savings associa-
tion to a bank charter is not considered to be a 'conversion transaction' if the bank elects
to remain a SAIF member and thereby continues to pay assessments to SAIF." Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 58, at 8.
66. Savings institutions assert that these laws "are so onerous they can no longer do
business under them." Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 1.
67. Id
68. See id. The FDIC does retain supervisory control over a savings association as
long as it is insured by either the SAIF or BIF. Nevertheless, if savings associations are
leaving the SAIF, the SAIFs premium income will decrease, along with its stability, and
the SAIF could conceivably cease to exist. This is contrary to FIRREA's intent to main-
tain a separate thrift industry, to keep savings institutions in the SAIF, and to achieve
financial soundness for the SAIF. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at
1100-01.
A major tenet of [FIRREA] ... is a commitment to maintain a separate and
viable industry charged with promoting home ownership through the provision
of affordable mortgage credit. This commitment includes the maintenance of a
separate deposit insurance fund for thrifts and the assurance that deposits in the
thrifts up to $100,000 are backed by the full faith and credit of the Federal
government.
House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 309, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, at 105.
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[FIRREA]." 6 9 Under FIRREA's "Qualified Thrift Lender" test, savings
associations must earmark seventy percent of their assets for residential
mortgage lending. 0 State savings banks are not held to this stringent
requirement.71 This lower requirement for state savings banks leaves
more assets open for commercial customers and thus more opportunity
for profit.
There is also a public policy concern that institutions might convert
their charters to escape the higher SAIF insurance premiums and the
higher cost of OTS supervision.7 2 Not only is the cost of OTS regulation
higher than the cost of state regulation, 3 but the OTS represents an ad-
ditional layer of regulation for savings associations that savings banks
avoid.74
Concerned that an exodus from SAIF insurance would hamper efforts
to replenish SAIF reserves, 5 the FDIC has instituted several measures
to control such an exodus. First, on December 12, 1989, the FDIC ap-
proved a temporary rule, whose formulation FIRREA mandated, 6 that
establishes entrance and exit fees to be paid to the respective insurance
fund for charter conversions resulting in transfers of insured deposits
from SAIF to BIF and vice versa.77 While the regulators encourage BIF-
69. Reed, Legislature Flirts with Bank Reform: Deals Near on Branching, Insurance
Sales, Crain's Chic. Bus., June 25, 1990, at 3 (LEXIS, Nexis library).
70. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(a)(m)(1), 103 Stat. at 343-44 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1)).
71. See id., § 303(a)(m)(1), 103 Stat. at 343-44 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(m)(1)); see Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 2.
72. Savings banks have lower regulation costs than savings and loans:
The [OTS] assesses savings and loans to cover its operating costs. For an insti-
tution with $500 million in assets, this comes to $145,000 a year; a $2 billion
institution is charged $424,000. In contrast, savings banks pay only their
F.D.I.C. insurance premium and, often, fees to their state, which often charge
them for expenses and regulatory exams. In New Jersey, for instance, a $2
billion savings bank pays a total of $96,000 in yearly fees to state regulators and
the F.D.I.C.
Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 1, 2.
73. Savings associations are subject to regulation by the OTS, the FDIC, and the state
banking authority, whereas state savings banks are regulated only by the FDIC and the
state banking authority. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Sen. Garn Puts in New CERCLA Liability Bill, Rep. LeFalce Gets More Spon-
sors, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 90-91 (July 16, 1990); Interim In-Out Fees, supra
note 60, at 923.
76. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(F)(ii), 103 Stat. at 199 (to be codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(F)(ii)). See generally FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 206(a)(7)(d)(2), 103 Stat. at 197-201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)) (statu-
tory guidelines for conversions).
Entrance fees are charged to an institution when it becomes a member of a new deposit
insurance fund. In addition, exit fees are charged to an institution when it exits its cur-
rent deposit insurance fund. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(E), 103 Stat.
at 198-99 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(E)).
77. See Interim In-Out Fees, supra note 60, at 923. Savings association resolutions,
branch sales, and other transactions may include conversion transactions and thus re-
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to-SAIF conversions, they discourage SAIF-to-BIF conversions." "[T]o
encourage potential bidders to acquire failing banks, [and to] further the
congressional intent of expeditiously resolving failed institutions," the
FDIC set a low BIF-to-SAIF exit fee to be paid into BIF upon leaving
that fund.79 Concomitantly, the FDIC set a higher exit fee for leaving
SAIF for BIF to discourage such conversions. Savings associations sup-
port this exit-and-entry fee system.' In its commentary on the interim
rule, the United States League of Savings Associations stated that "as
long as members of the SAIF are required to pay higher insurance premi-
ums than members of the BIF, exit and entry fees help level the playing
field for SAIF members."81
The second measure intended to control the loss of income to the
SAIF is a FIRREA-mandated five-year moratorium on conversions from
SAIF to BIF. 2 This moratorium is not to be construed as prohibiting
conversion by a savings association to a state bank charter as long as the
resulting bank remains a SAIF member for that five-year period.13
Additionally, the FDIC retains discretion to decide whether the result-
ing post-conversion institution qualifies as a savings association or a
bank." If the FDIC deems the entity a savings association, then it will
remain subject to OTS regulation. If the post-conversion institution is
not deemed a savings association, its regulatory and supervisory struc-
ture would exclude the OTS. 5
These conversions have caused considerable debate. The OTS objects
vehemently to savings associations converting to state savings bank sta-
tus because, after conversion, the FDIC supplants the OTS as primary
quire the payment of entrance and exit fees to the appropriate funds. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, supra note 58, at 8.
78. SAIF-to-BIF conversions represent a major cost to savings associations:
Savings and loan leaders say they would love to become commercial banks, but
cannot afford to convert. They point to Internal Revenue Service regulations
that would expose them to a large tax liability, upon conversion, for the way
they account for bad debt reserves. And, there would be stiff entrance and exit
fees for changing from the savings industry insurance fund to the banking in-
dustry fund.
Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 4.
79. Interim In-Out Fees, supra note 60, at 923.
80. See supra note 78.
91. Interim In-Out Fees, supra note 60, at 923. Savings associations claim, however,
that the "heavy assessments make it hard for them to earn a profit and that the [OTS]
represents a third and unnecessary layer of regulation. They already come under scrutiny
from state regulators and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which administers
the insurance fund that protects all depositors." Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 1.
82. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(A)Cii), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(A)Cti)).
83. See id, § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(G), 103 Stat. at 199 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(d)(2)(G)); DiNuzzo, supra note 61, at 4.
84. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(d)(3)(G), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3)(G)); supra note 2.
85. See Wayne, supra note 61, at D5, col. 2.
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regulator.8 6 Timothy Ryan, director of the OTS, fears that permitting
charter conversion "will give these institutions the same freedoms that
led to abuses and to the Federal bailout of the savings and loan
industry." '87
Commentators argue, however, that such conversions result in cheaper
operations for institutions. They suggest that the FDIC consider facili-
tating conversions in order to gain the benefits of efficiency and standard-
ized rules by collapsing the BIF and SAIF into one fund.8 8 For instance,
the United States League of Savings Institutions' Brian Smith suggests a
merger of BIF and SAIF.89 Not only would exit and entrance fees be-
come unnecessary, but the " 'administrative complexities' that impose an
imbalanced premium burden on institutions" would be eliminated.9'
D. Current Financial Condition
Pursuant to FIRREA, SAIF is to receive up to two billion dollars in
funding from the Treasury for each of the years 1992 to 1999.91 Addi-
tionally, FIRREA authorizes increases in deposit insurance premiums
paid by SAIF-member institutions to augment SAIF income.92 The
FDIC may levy increasingly high annual deposit premiums on savings
associations over the next few years to replenish SAIF reserves, which
are currently depleted. 9 If necessary, premiums can rise to a maximum
86. See id. at DI, col. 5.
87. Id.
88. See Interim In-Out Fees, supra note 60, at 923.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(6)(E), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(E)).
92. The FDIC sets the SAIF deposit-insurance premiums to be paid by savings as-
sociations. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(1)(D), 103 Stat. at 209 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(D)).
93. See id., § 208(4)(1)(D), 103 Stat. at 209 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(b)(1)(D)). FIRREA sets forth the following schedule of premiums to be paid by
SAIF members:
(Basis Points)...
Under FIRREA
1990 20.8
1991-93 23.0
1994-97 18.0
1998 15.0
Id. See Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3. In reference to bonds,
basis points are defined as 0.01% of yield. One basis point for purposes of deposit insur-
ance would equal 0.01% of each one hundred dollars of deposits. See Barron's Diction-
ary of Banking Terms 74 (1990).
The SAIF is currently depleted. See Labaton, Savings Bailout May be Hindered by
Political Impasse Over Money, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1990, at Dl, col. I. Moreover, Con-
gress continues to delay funding for the savings association clean-up, and funding com-
mitments in the near future are unlikely. See Thomas, Funding Delays for S&L Cleanup
to Cost Taxpayers $1 Billion to $3 Billion More, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1990, at A6, col. 1;
Duke, Congress Fails to Provide More Funding for S&L Bailout, Raising Threat to RTC,
Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at C19, col 1.
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of 32.5 cents for each $100 of insured deposits, but the increase in one
year is restricted to 7.5 cents.' Once the insurance fund exceeds 1.25%
of total deposits, the FDIC will issue premium rebates. 95 One commen-
tator has noted that the" 'Skids Are Greased' for Congress to pass legis-
lation giving the FDIC unlimited authority to raise deposit insurance
assessment rates."96 The SAIF's current financial condition indicates,
however, that the FDIC is effectively paralyzed until Congress assigns
funds to the SAIF,97 or, alternatively, to the RTC, which must cover
costs for the SAIF until the fund's reserves are replenished. 9
E. Operation of SAIF
1. SAIF Assistance
FIRREA established SAIF "open-thrift assistance" to bolster savings
associations that are not yet insolvent.99 Technically, SAIF should pro-
vide financial assistance to savings associations that are still operating; o
because SAIF is entirely depleted, however, any open-thrift assistance
must come from the RTC. 101
94. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(l)(D)(v)(II)-(III), 103 Stat. at 209 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(D)(v)(II)-(III)).
95. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(2)(d)(3)(B), 103 Stat. at 211, (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(d)(3)(B)); Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 26,
at 3; Doyle & DeSimone, Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Savings Associations
Under FIRREA, 13 Issues in Banking Regulation (Bank Admin. Inst.) No. 3, at 16
(1990, Winter). For a comparison of BIF premiums, see Note, A Note to Congress and
the FDIC.- After FIRREA, Where's the BIF, supra note 43, at S415 n.43.
96. FDIC Watch, (Mortgage Commentary Publication, Am. Banker Bond Buyer)
No. 90-35, at 1, col. 1 (Sept. 21, 1990).
97. "The S&L cleanup has already plowed through the $50 billion initially requested
for failed thrifts, along with the $53 billion in temporary spending. Overall costs are
expected to reach $200 billion, plus hundreds of billions more in interest costs over sev-
eral decades." Thomas, Temporary Funding for S&L Cleanup Unlikely to Be Fully Re-
paid, GAO Says, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1991, at B2, col. 1. "The failure to provide new
funds raises the possibility that the [RTC], the agency created to manage the bailout, will
have to stop seizing and selling bankrupt thrifts." Duke, supra note 10, at col. 1.
98. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(6)(H), 103 Stat. at 220 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(H)).
If amounts available to the [SAIF] for purposes other than the payment of ad-
ministrative expenses are insufficient for the [SAIF] to carry out the purposes of
this Act, the [FDIC] may request the [RTC] to provide, and the Oversight
Board of the [RTC] (in the discretion of the Oversight Board) may pay, such
amount as may be needed for such purposes.
Id.
99. RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance as Way to Keep Size of Prblem in Bounds,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 23, at A-13 (Feb. 2, 1990) (WESTLAW, BNA
Library, DER File) [hereinafter RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance].
100. See FIRREA, supra note I, § 211(3)(6)(B), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(B)); RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance, supra note 99, at A-13.
101. See FIRREA, supra note I, § 21 1(3)(6)(H), 103 Stat. at 220 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(H)); see also RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance, supra note 99, at
A-13 ("Technically, open-thrift assistance would be provided through the SAIF, set up
under FIRREA to insure those S&Ls not already insolvent." SAIF had a zero-balance at
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FIRREA mandates that the FDIC, as SAIF administrator, must con-
sider requests from troubled SAIF-member savings associations for fi-
nancial assistance if the associations meet nine criteria."° In addition to
these nine criteria, savings associations should be able to demonstrate,
among other things, that the cost to the FDIC in assisting the institution
will be less than other available alternatives and that the assistance will
not be diverted to other purposes.10 3
Such federal financial assistance would allow financially weakened, but
well-run, savings associations with a good chance of survival to remain
operating, thereby minimizing the ultimate risk to the SAIF. Critics of
open-thrift aid, however, argue that such assistance is tantamount to pro-
longing the inevitable demise of these savings institutions and thus con-
stitutes throwing good money after bad." 4 Advocating a survival-of-the-
fittest theory, such critics would prefer to see near-insolvent savings as-
sociations fail in due course rather than prolong their lives artificially.105
L. William Seidman, Chairman of the FDIC and a defender of open-
thrift aid, acknowledges that members of Congress have been critical of
open-thrift aid, arguing that "it would be a reincarnation of a forbear-
ance program that basically allowed insolvent savings institutions to re-
main open and thereby compound losses[,] and raised the government's
cleanup costs for every day these thrifts stayed in business."" °6 Seidman
stresses, however, that financial assistance to savings associations will
only be considered if the cost of assistance is "clearly less than" the cost
of closing the institution or placing it in conservatorship or receiver-
ship.107 Because the criteria that the FDIC uses to examine assistance
proposals are flexible, °10 it is uncertain whether Seidman's assurance will
year-end 1989. See U.S. Senate Bill Calls for Creation of Financial Services Crime Divi-
sion, 7 Fin. Serv. Rep. (IAC) No. 14, at 6 (July 4, 1990).
102. FIRREA added these requirements, which apply to both mutual and stock-held
savings associations, to establish standards for the FDIC in evaluating requests for assist-
ance. See RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance, supra note 99, at A-13. FIR.REA spells
out the requirements for eligibility. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(8)(k)(5)(A)(i)-(ii),
103 Stat. at 260-61 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k)(5)(A)(i)-(ii)); see infra note 108.
103. See Statement of Policy on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks and Savings
Associations, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,559, 12,559-60 (1990) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1812(13)(c), (13)(k)(5)).
104. See Definition of Distressed Areas Paves Way for Open Thrift Assistance Plan,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 55, at A-13 (Mar. 21, 1990) (WESTLAW, BNA
Library, DER File) [hereinafter Definitions of Distressed Areas].
105. See id.
106. Id. Prior to FIRREA, the FHLBB/FSLIC forbearance program gave temporary
relief from minimum capital requirements, allowing weakened savings associations to
stay open. See 55 Fed. Reg. 27,185, 27,193 (1990).
107. See Definition of Distressed Areas, supra note 104, at A-13.
108. The assistance proposal criteria required by FIRREA is as follows:
(A)(i) Troubled Condition Criteria. - The Corporation determines -
(I) that grounds for appointment of a conservator or receiver exist
or likely will exist in the future unless the member's tangible capital is
increased;
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hold true. °9
2. Funding
FIRREA authorizes the FDIC to use the SAIF as the source of funds
for resolving failed or failing savings associations.11° SAIF will only
fund the resolution of those insolvent savings associations that were not
insured by the FSLIC, or for which a conservator or receiver is ap-
(II) that it is unlikely that the member can achieve positive tangible
capital without assistance; and
(III) that providing assistance pursuant to the member's proposal
would be likely to lessen the risk to the Corporation.
(ii) Other Criteria. - The member meets the following criteria:(I) Before enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, the member was solvent under
applicable regulatory accounting principles but had negative tangible
capital.
(11) The member's negative tangible capital position is substan-
tially attributable to its participation in acquisition and merger trans-
actions that were instituted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation for supervi-
sory reasons.
(I1) The member is a qualified thrift lender (as defined in section
10(m) of the Home Owners' Loan Act) or would be a qualified thrift
lender if commercial real estate owned and nonperforming commer-
cial loans acquired in acquisition and merger transactions that were
instituted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board or the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation for supervisory reasons were
excluded from the member's total assets.
(IV) The appropriate Federal banking agency has determined that
the member's management is competent and has complied with appli-
cable laws, rules, and supervisory directives and orders.
(V) The member's management did not engage in insider dealing
or speculative practices or other activities that jeopardized the mem-
ber's safety and soundness or contributed to its impaired capital
position.
(VI) The member's offices are located in an economically de-
pressed region.
(B) Corporation Consideration of Assistance Proposal. - If a member meets
the requirements of clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the Corporation
shall consider providing direct financial assistance.(C) Economically Depressed Region Defined. - For purposes of this para-
graph, the term 'economically depressed region' means any geographical region
which the Corporation determines by regulation to be a region within which
real estate values have suffered serious decline due to severe economic condi-
tions, such as a decline in energy or agricultural values or prices.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(8)(k)(5)(A)-(C), 103 Stat. at 260-61 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(k)(5)(A)-(C)).
109. See Definitions of Distressed Areas, supra note 104.
110. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(a), 103 Stat. at 363-69 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441(a)). FIRREA intends SAIF to be the source of funding for insolvent and
near-insolvent savings associations. See itL There is currently a zero-balance in SAIF,
however, and Congress appears unwilling to provide sufficient funds for this purpose. See
RTC Considers Open-Thrift Assistance, supra note 99 and accompanying text; Duke, Con-
gress Fails to Provide More Funding for S&L Bailout, Raising Threat to R TC, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 29, 1990, at C19, col. 1; supra note 10.
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pointed after August 9, 1992.111 Savings associations insured by the
FSLIC prior to FIRREA's enactment and appointed a conservator or
receiver between January 1, 1990 and August 9, 1992 will be funded by
the RTC." 2 Those insolvent savings associations not insured by the
FSLIC prior to August 9, 1989 will be funded by the FDIC through the
FSLIC Resolution Fund.1 13
3. Procedure for Seizing/Liquidating Savings Associations
The FDIC has been given broad resolution authority.I14 It may either
liquidate the assets of a failed savings association or find an acquirer,
using the proceeds of such disposition to pay off depositors. 115 The
FDIC's broad resolution authority includes the power to "slash ap-
praised real estate prices to find buyers [for savings associations]." '16 As
an FDIC staff member stated, "'We go after maximizing collection'....
'Everything we have is for sale; that's our motto.' "117 In addition, under
FIRREA, the FDIC may even "nullify all the failed [institutions'] con-
tracts in order to speed up liquidation." '
III. THE FDIC's REGULATION OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS
UNDER FIRREA
The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
"adopted provisions which expand, enhance and clarify enforcement
powers of the financial institution regulatory agencies."' 19 This expan-
sion of the FDIC's powers under FIRREA is characterized by its broad
mandate to act in the name of ensuring the "safety and soundness"12 of
the savings association industry.12'
111. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(a), 103 Stat. at 363-69 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
112. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(a)(b)(3)(A), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)); Regulation of Savings Association, supra note 6, at 1024.
113. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra, note 6, at 1024-25.
114. See generally FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(a)(d)(2), 103 Stat. at 225-27 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)) (outlining general powers of the FDIC to seize and
liquidate assets of a savings association in whatever fashion the FDIC deems necessary
under circumstances).
115. See id.
116. Riders on the Storm: FDIC to Set Up Shop in Massachusetts, 10 Boston Bus. J.,
No. 16, at 2 (June 11, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library).
117. Id.
118. Id. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(a)(e)(1), 103 Stat. at 234 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)).
119. See House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 311, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, at 107.
120. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra, note 6, at 1026.
121. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 912, 103 Stat. at 482-83 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818); Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1026.
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A. Powers Transferred from the FHLBB
All deposit insurance regulations and orders of the FHLBB or the
FSLIC that were in effect as of August 9, 1989 remain in effect and are
enforceable by the FDIC."2 FIRREA, however, "significantly expands
the supervisory and enforcement authority of the FDIC with respect to
savings associations over that which the [FHLBB] possessed with respect
to FSLIC-insured institutions."" 2  The FDIC must administer the rules
and regulations of the FHLBB and the FSLIC relating to: (1) savings
association conservatorships and receiverships, (2) savings association
account insurance, (3) financial assistance to savings associations to pre-
vent default, and (4) the FSLIC deposit insurance fund.1 24  FIRREA
charges the FDIC with responsibility for reviewing its own deposit insur-
ance scheme, as well as the FSLIC's, to create a uniform set of regula-
tions applicable to all insured deposits.1 2 - In doing so, the FDIC must
"consider all relevant factors necessary to promote safety and soundness,
depositor confidence, and the stability of deposits in insured depository
institutions." 126
B. FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Activities
The FDIC has broad discretion in determining savings association al-
122. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 402(a), 103 Stat. at 357-58 (to be codified at 54 Fed.
Reg. 41,359 (1989)).
123. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1026.
124. Id. at 1027. The FDIC assumes the responsibility for the following former
FHLBB and FSLIC regulations and rules for savings associations: powers and conduct
of conservatorship; powers and conduct of receivership; applications for insurance of ac-
counts; corporations' right of purchase; premium assessment; premiums in mergers, con-
solidations, or purchases of bulk assets; secondary reserve advertising of insurance of
accounts; continuation of insurance; reservation of right concerning advertising; other
insurance of guaranty; equal opportunity in employment; settlement of insurance; termi-
nation of insurance; possession by receiver;, powers and duties as receiver; priority of
claims; creditor claims; claims of accountholders; audits; accounting practices; reports;
final discharge and release of receiver;, purchase and assumption transactions; receiver-
ship rules; insurance of accounts evidenced by negotiable instruments; insurance of annu-
ity accounts; net worth certificates; voluntary assisted-merger program; procedures for
the administration and determination of claims filed with the FSLIC as receiver;, present-
ment of claims to receiver prior to commencing litigation; procedures for the processing
and determination of review of the determinations of the FSLIC as receiver;, procedures
for the administration and determination of requests for expedited relief from decisions or
threatened actions of the FSLIC as receiver;, and FSLIC financial operations. See FDIC
OTS Divide Former FHLBB Rules Governing Conservatorships/Receivershis, 53 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 538-40 (Oct. 16, 1989).
125. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 402(c)(3), 103 Stat. at 358 (to be codified at 54 Fed.
Reg. 41,359 (1989)).
The FDIC is required by [FIRREA] to review its regulations, principles, and
interpretations for deposit insurance coverage and those established by the
FSLIC and to prescribe a uniform set of regulations which shall be applicable to
all insured deposits in savings associations and banks by May 8, 1990.
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1027-28.
126. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 402(c)(4), 103 Stat. at 358-59 (to be codified at 54 Fed.
Reg. 41,359 (1989)).
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lowable and non-allowable activities based on the risk that such activities
pose to the SAIF.127 The FDIC's extended oversight powers, cease-and-
desist powers, investment regulation powers, deposit-termination powers,
capital-requirement powers and special powers are all intended to safe-
guard the SAIF from further losses.
1. Oversight Authority
FIRREA gives the OTS oversight authority for savings associa-
tions. 1 28 Yet under FIRREA, the FDIC has authority to recommend to
the Director of the OTS enforcement action for an insured savings asso-
ciation.129 The FDIC may also proceed directly against an insured sav-
ings association if the OTS has not taken any enforcement action within
sixty days following the FDIC's recommendation. Further, the FDIC
may initiate enforcement proceedings against an insured savings associa-
tion prior to the expiration of sixty days if "exigent circumstances"
exist. 1 30
2. Cease-and-Desist Powers
FIRREA authorizes the FDIC to prohibit, by regulation or order, any
specific activity, act or practice conducted by an insured savings associa-
tion that the FDIC considers a serious threat to SAIF. 31 Such a "cease-
127. See id., § 221(4)(m)(3), 103 Stat. at 268 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(3));
see also Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1096 ("The FDIC is author-
ized to prohibit, by regulation or order, any savings association from directly engaging in
any activity that the FDIC determines to pose a serious threat to SAIF."). See generally
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222, 103 Stat. at 269-73 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(e))
(setting forth activities of savings associations).
128. Oversight authority means primary regulatory authority. The OTS is responsible
for examining and supervising state and federal savings associations. See Barron's Dic-
tionary of Banking Terms 433 (1990).
129. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 912, 103 Stat. at 482-83 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(t)(1)).
130. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 912(t)(2),(3), 103 Stat. at 483 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(t)(2),(3)); Glancz & Hackenbury, The Impact of FIRREA on Directors and
Officers of Financial Institutions, 13 Issues in Banking Reg. (Bank Admin. Inst.) No. 3, at
12 (1990, Winter).
If the Director does not take the recommended enforcement action or provide
an acceptable plan for addressing the FDIC's concerns within sixty days, the
FDIC is authorized to take such enforcement action itself if it determines that
the association is in an unsafe or unsound condition or that the failure to take
such enforcement action will result in the continuance of an unsafe or unsound
practice. The FDIC would not be required to wait sixty days if it determines
that exigent circumstances exist that require immediate action.
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1029 (footnotes omitted).
131. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)). Under enhanced "cease-and-desist" powers, the FDIC may restrict
insured savings associations from any activity deemed to pose a threat to SAIF. See
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1096.
The FDIC's authority to prohibit activities that pose a serious threat to SAIF is
not limited to activities authorized for state-chartered savings associations. The
FDIC may prohibit federal savings associations from engaging in an activity
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and-desist" order may include general restrictions on growth or specific
restrictions on operational or investment activities by a savings associa-
tion.132 FIRREA extends the FDIC's cease-and-desist powers beyond
the institution itself to an "institution-affiliated party.'" 33 Moreover, the
FDIC may require a savings association or "institution-affiliated party"
to take affirmative action to correct an unsafe and unsound condition.,'
The FDIC thus has the augmented discretionary power to issue a cease-
and-desist order against an institution or any individual who qualifies as
an "institution-affiliated party."
FIRREA also expands the FDIC's jurisdiction in enforcement pro-
ceedings against institution-affiliated parties. Under FIRREA, the of-
fending institution-affiliated party need not be associated with the savings
association at the time of the FDIC action so long as notice of the action
is served within six years of the individual's separation from the institu-
tion. In contrast, the FHLBB could only proceed against an institution-
that is specifically authorized for federal savings associations if the FDIC deter-
mines that the activity poses a serious threat to SAIF.
Id. (footnote omitted).
132. Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3; see FIRREA, supra note
1, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
133. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b)(6)). An institution-affiliated party is defined as:
(1) any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a
bank holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution;
(2) any other person who has filed or is required to file a change-in-control
notice with the appropriate Federal banking agency under section 7G");
(3) any shareholder (other than a bank holding company), consultant, joint
venture partner, and any other person as determined by the appropriate Federal
banking agency (by regulation or case-by-case) who participates in the conduct
of the affairs of an insured depository institution; and
(4) any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or account-
ant) who knowingly or recklessly participates in
(A) any violation of any law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice,
which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant
adverse efflect on, the insured depository institution.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(f)(6), 103 Stat. at 193 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(u)); see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 901(b)(1)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 447 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1)).
134. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(6), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)). The FDIC is authorized to require a savings association or an insti-
tution-affiliated party to take the following actions:
(i) make restitution or reimbursement or indemnification against loss if such
association or institution-affiliated party was unjustly enriched in connection
with such violation or practice, or the violation involved a reckless disregard for
the law, any applicable regulation, or prior order of the appropriate federal
banking agency; (ii) restrict the growth of the association; (iii) dispose of any
loan or asset involved; (iv) rescind agreements or contracts; (v) rescind em-
ployment of qualified officers or employees; or (vi) take any other action as the
... FDIC deems appropriate.
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1029, n. 141.
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affiliated party if such a relationship still existed. 35
Additionally, the FDIC has been given broader power to issue tempo-
rary cease-and-desist orders than had been given to the FHLBB and the
FSLIC. Neither the FHLBB nor the FSLIC had explicit authority to
issue temporary cease-and-desist orders in response to the incomplete or
inaccurate status of a savings association's financial records.136 Pursuant
to FIRREA, however, the FDIC may issue temporary cease-and-desist
orders requiring the cessation of any activity or practice if the FDIC is
unable to determine the financial condition of the savings association or
the status of a transaction due to the savings association's incomplete
financial records.137 In addition, the burden of proof that the FDIC
must meet to issue a temporary cease-and-desist order is reduced from
that formerly required of the FHLBB.' 31 The FHLBB could not issue a
temporary cease-and-desist order against a savings association absent a
showing that the "association or [a] person participating in the conduct
of the association's affairs was engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice,
the continuation of which was likely to cause a 'substantial' dissipation of
the association's assets."' 39 The FDIC, however, need only show that
the continuation of the unsafe or unsound practice is likely to cause more
than a minimal or nominal dissipation of the savings association's
assets. 140
In addition to cease-and-desist powers, FIRREA also authorizes the
FDIC to permit a state savings association to perform otherwise "imper-
missible" activities. The criteria for approval require that the FDIC first
determine that the well-being of the SAIF is not jeopardized, that the
FIRREA-prescribed capital standards are not compromised, and that
135. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1030.
[FIRREA] provides that, even if an institution-affiliated person resigns, is fired,
or becomes separated from an association ... in any other manner, the...
FDIC may proceed against the party as long as notice of such action is served
within six years from when the individual becomes separated from the
institution.
Id; see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(a), 103 Stat. at 459 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(3)).
The FHLBB's authority was more limited than the FDIC's for two reasons: 1) termi-
nation of the relationship between the individual and the institution may have terminated
the authority to issue a cease-and-desist order, and 2) "institution-affiliated party" is a
broader term than "person participating," which was the operative term in the FHLBB's
statute. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1030.
136. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1029-30.
137. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(c)(3)(i)).
138. Compare 12 U.S.C. 1818(c)(1) (1988) (power to issue temporary cease-and-desist
orders) with FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1)) (extending powers to issue temporary cease-and-desist orders).
139. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1030.
140. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1)); see also Malloy, supra note 12, at 1151 (FIRREA provides for issu-
ance of temporary cease and desist order on less stringent, alternatively set out findings.).
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the activity would benefit the health of the savings association.' 4 '
3. Investments
a. Equity Investments
Before FIRREA, savings associations could invest up to one percent of
their assets in sub-investment-grade corporate debt securities and com-
mercial paper,142 and up to five percent of their assets in commercial
loans that included sub-investment-grade corporate debt securities and
commercial paper.143  These securities, popularly known as "junk
bonds," represent a very risky, high-yield investment opportunity. Pur-
suant to FIRREA, insured savings associations may no longer purchase
non-investment-grade securities, and they are required to divest them-
selves of any currently held junk bonds by 1994.'"1
Under FIRREA, the same limitations apply to a federally insured sav-
ings association's equity investments, 145 whether made by a state or fed-
eral savings association. As a general rule, FIRREA prohibits a state
savings association from engaging as principal in activities impermissible
for a federal savings association. FIRREA thus holds federal and state
savings associations to the same standard and effectively precludes state-
chartered savings associations from taking advantage of activities permit-
ted under state law.1" In addition, "[t]he FDIC has the responsibility to
require divestiture of impermissible equity investments 'as quickly as can
be prudently done, and in any event not later than July 1, 1994.' "147
FDIC regulations require any state-chartered savings association holding
one or more impermissible equity investments as of August 9, 1989 48 to
file an application outlining divestiture plans for the impermissible in-
vestments and requesting the FDIC's approval of the divestiture plan. 149
To regulate a savings association's equity investments, the FDIC re-
141. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222(a), 103 Stat, at 269 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.§ 1831e).
142. See 12 C.F.R § 545.75(d) (1989).
143. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.46 (1989).
144. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222(d), 103 Stat. at 270 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.§ 183le(d)). Investments are only considered "of investment grade" if they are rated in
one of the four highest categories of a nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tion. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222, 103 Stat. at 270 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 183 ld(4)(A)).
145. FIRREA does not define "equity investment." Id, § 222(c),(d), 103 Stat. at 269-
70 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(c),(d)). However, the "legislative history indicates
that the restriction on equity investments is intended to apply to investments in equity
securities, equity investments in real estate, and any other equity investment." Regula-
tion of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1081.
146. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222(c)-(d), 103 Stat. at 269-70 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 183 1(c), (d)); Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1075.
147. Malloy, supra note 12, at 1138; FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222(d), 103 Stat. at 270
(to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 183 le(d)).
148. FIRREA was enacted on August 9, 1989. See supra note 1.
149. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1082. Savings associations
entering commitments to engage in impermissible investment activities prior to August 9,
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quires that state and federally chartered savings associations file notice
with the FDIC at least thirty days before acquiring or establishing a sub-
sidiary or commencing a new activity.' 50 The FDIC further requires a
state savings association to file a letter application with the FDIC at least
sixty days prior to initiating activities permissible for state savings as-
sociations but impermissible for federal savings associations.15'
The purpose of these restrictions 5 2 is to safeguard the SAIF from fur-
ther losses."53 Thus, although the FDIC may grant exceptions, it may do
so only for institutions that meet the new, tougher capital
requirements.1 54
1989 will not be allowed to honor those commitments based on the theory of impossibil-
ity of performance or subsequent illegality. See id. at 1082-83.
150. See FDIC Adopts Final Rules on State Savings Association Activities, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 441 (Sept. 17, 1990).
151. See id.
The letter application must contain the following information: (i) a brief de-
scription of the activity and the manner in which it is (or will be) conducted;
(ii) a copy, if available, or any feasibility study, management plan, financial
projections, business plan, or similar document concerning the conduct of the
activity; (iii) an estimate of the present or expected dollar volume of the activ-
ity; (iv) resolutions by the board of directors or board of trustees of the savings
association authorizing the conduct of such activity and the filing of the applica-
tion; (v) a current statement of the association's assets, liabilities, and capital on
both a consolidated and a non-consolidated basis; (vi) a discussion by manage-
ment of its analysis regarding the impact of the proposed activity on the associa-
tion's earnings, capital adequacy, and general condition; (vii) a statement by
the association of whether or not it is in compliance with the fully phased-in
capital standards including a calculation of the relevant capital ratios; and
(viii) a statement of the authority the association is relying upon for the con-
duct of the activity in the amount set forth in the application.
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1076-77, n.469.
152. Activities considered impermissible for federally chartered savings associations
are those unrelated to traditional home-mortgage lending. See Regulation of Savings As-
sociations, supra note 6, at 1074.
153. See id. at 1076. FIRREA's activity restrictions are meant for FDIC-insured state
and federally chartered savings associations. Because a state-chartered savings associa-
tion is not required to be FDIC-insured, it may opt out of the more stringent require-
ments by voluntarily terminating its deposit insurance. It would then be governed only
by state-law restrictions on savings-association activities. Voluntary termination is un-
likely, however, because the lack of FDIC insurance puts a savings association at a com-
petitive disadvantage in the marketplace. See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying
text. But see Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1075 & n.459 (state-
chartered savings associations can voluntarily terminate their federal deposit insurance
except if the savings association is chartered in a state that makes federal deposit insur-
ance compulsory.)
154. See Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, supra note 2, at
S330.
A state-chartered savings association would be permitted to engage in an activ-
ity that is not permissible for a federal savings association only if the association
was in compliance with the fully phased-in capital standards applicable to sav-
ings associations, and if the FDIC determines by regulation or order that the
activity or investment would pose no significant risk of loss to the [SAIF].
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1076.
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b. Qualified Investments
FIRREA further limits savings association lending activities by requir-
ing savings associations to hold an average of seventy percent of portfolio
assets in "qualified investments."' " Qualified investments are restricted
to home financing activities.' 56 Prior to FIRREA, the investment re-
quirement for residential mortgage assets was sixty percent of total as-
sets.' 57 FIRREA's qualified-investment requirements thus effectively
force savings associations to specialize in home mortgage services.158
4. Power to Terminate Deposit Insurance
FIRREA both reaffirms and enhances the FDIC's power to terminate
deposit insurance and establishes new authority to suspend insurance
temporarily if the FDIC determines that a savings association's activities
constitute "unsafe and unsound" banking practices.' 5 9 This power en-
155. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(a)(m)(1)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 344 (to be codified
12 U.S.C. § 1467(a)); Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3.
156. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(a)(m)(4)(C)(ii)-(fii), 103 Stat. at 347 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a)).
157. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a.
158. The qualified thrift lender test "was toughened by FIRREA with the intent of
pushing thrifts back towards their traditional housing role. However, this shove was so
strong that it encourages thrifts to continue lending to the homebuilding industry when
the oversupply in some markets would suggest otherwise." Cocheo, Cleanup. Year 1,
ABA Banking J. 35, 38 (Oct. 1990).
159. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 926(7)(8)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 491 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(8)(A)-(B)).
[The FSLIC was authorized to terminate a savings association's insured status
if the FSLIC determined any of the following points: (i) the association, its
directors, or its trustees had engaged in or were engaging in unsafe or unsound
practices in conducting the business of the association; (ii) the association was
in an unsafe or unsound condition to continue operations as an insured institu-
tion; or (iii) the association, its directors, or its trustees had violated any appli-
cable law, regulation, order, written condition imposed by the FSLIC in
connection with the approval of any application or other request by the associa-
tion, or written agreement entered into between the association and the FSLIC.
The FSLIC was generally required to provide the association with 120 days'
notice of its intention to terminate the association's deposit insurance, during
which time the association could take corrective action.
Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1032-33.
The FDIC's deposit insurance in set out differently. Pursuant to FIRREA, the FDIC
may terminate a savings association's deposit insurance when it determines:
(i) an insured depository institution or the directors or trustees of an insured
depository institution have engaged or are engaging in unsafe or unsound prac-
tices in conducting the business of the depository institution;
(ii) an insured depository institution is in an unsafe or unsound condition to
continue operations as an insured institution; or
(iii) an insured depository institution or the directors or trustees of the insured
institution have violated any applicable law, regulation, order, condition im-
posed in writing by the Corporation in connection with the approval of any
application or other request by the insured depository institution, or written
agreement entered into between the insured depository institution and the
Corporation.
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ables the FDIC to "limit its potential pay-out and... effectively control
the growth of an insolvent institution."'" FIRREA authorizes the
FDIC to suspend the deposit insurance of savings associations that have
no tangible capital, 161 to determine the length of time (within certain
statutorily prescribed limits) in which deposits will remain insured fol-
lowing insurance termination, 162 and to issue a temporary order sus-
pending deposit insurance after termination proceedings have begun if
the FDIC finds the association has no tangible capital. 63
Although the FDIC may suspend deposit insurance whenever a sav-
ings association has no tangible capital, FIRREA provides special ex-
emptions in certain circumstances."' "Savings associations which have
no tangible capital, but which have goodwill, will be considered 'special
supervisory associations' for temporary-suspension-of-insurance pur-
poses."' 65 The FDIC may, however, issue a temporary order suspending
insurance on all deposits received by a "special supervisory" savings as-
sociation if:
a) its capital has suffered a material decline; b) it is engaging in an
unsafe or unsound practice; c) it is in an unsafe or unsound condition;
or d) it is in violation of any law, rule, regulation, order agreement, or
condition, including the failure to enter into an acceptable capital im-
provement plan as required by [FIRREA].166
5. Capital Requirements
There are "three keys to survival for existing savings and loans under
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 926(1)(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 489 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a)(2)). The offending institution has thirty days to correct the unacceptable situa-
tion before the FDIC acts to terminate its deposit insurance. See id. at 490.
160. FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases Penalties Al-
lowed, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 424 (Sept. 25, 1989) [hereinafter FIRREA
Expands Powers].
161. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 926, 103 Stat. at 490-91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a)(8)). "Tangible capital" is defined as including common stockholders' equity,
certain noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and related surplus, minority interests in
the equity accounts of fully consolidated subsidiaries, qualifying supervisory goodwill,
and functional equivalents of noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, except that all
intangible assets (besides qualifying supervisory goodwill and certain purchased mortgage
servicing rights) are deducted from the institution's capital base. See Regulation of Sav-
ings Associations, supra note 6, at 1040.
162. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 926(5), 103 Stat. at 490 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a)(b)). Deposits will remain insured for at least six months and for no more than
two years. Id.
163. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 926(7), 103 Stat. at 491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a)(8)).
164. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
165. FIRREA Expands Powers, supra note 160, at 424; FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 926(7)(8)(B), 103 Stat. at 491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(8)(B)).
166. FIRREA Expands Powers, supra, note 160, at 424; see FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 926(7), 103 Stat. at 491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(8)); Regulation of Savings
Associations, supra note 6, at 1033, n.169.
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FIRREA: capital, capital and capital. 167 Accordingly, FIRREA estab-
lishes new, more stringent capital requirements for savings associa-
tions. 168 In order to comply with FIRREA's capital requirements, many
savings associations will have to raise additional capital by issuing new
stock or bonds or selling off assets.16 9
Upon FIRREA's enactment, the FDIC took over non-complying in-
stitutions, raised their capital to meet FIRREA's requirements, and then
sold them.1 70 This action proved too costly a remedy in light of the large
number of savings associations that failed to comply with FIRREA's
new capital requirements. 17' The FDIC's current approach to curing
capital deficiencies in savings associations is, therefore, to seek out pri-
vate investors and to use other methods to raise levels of capital." 2
Failure to satisfy the capital requirements will result in the imposition
of numerous restrictions on an association's activities, including limita-
tions on an association's asset growth, acceptance of brokered deposits,
and, in the case of state-chartered savings associations, the ability to
engage in activities pursuant to state-granted authority that are imper-
missible for federal savings associations.17 3
As one indirect method of controlling capital levels, FIRREA restricts
a savings association's acceptance of brokered deposits.174 Brokered de-
167. Berliner, President and CEO of Second National Federal Savings Bank, Addresses
Second Annual Bankruptcy Conference, PR Newswire (Oct. 19, 1989) (LEXIS, NEXIS
library).
168. Thirty-eight percent of currently solvent savings associations fail to meet the
tough capital requirements. See Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3.
The imposition of higher capital standards for savings associations is intended to discour-
age participation in excessively risky activities by requiring higher levels of capital for
risky activities and forcing equity owners to face greater risk of loss if the association
becomes insolvent. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1034. Fur-
ther, the deposit-insurance fund is afforded increased protection against the large losses
involved in an insolvency if higher capital standards are required. See id at 1034.
169. See Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 3.
Florida Federal Savings Bank probably will need a combination of investor
capital, government financial assistance and a resolution to its student loan
problem to comply with government capital standards .... Florida Federal was
among the banks and savings and loans required to submit recapitalization
plans to the government for failing to meet capital standards under [FIRREA]
Bank Officials: Florida Federal Needs Help, Proprietary to the United Press Interna-
tional, Regional News (March 30, 1990) (LEXIS, NEXIS library).
170. See Bank Officials: Florida Federal Needs Help, supra note 169.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1034 (footnotes omitted).
174. The term "deposit broker" is defined as:
(1) Any person engaged in the business of placing funds, or facilitating the
placement of funds, of third parties with insured banks, or the business of plac-
ing funds with insured banks for the purpose of selling interests in those depos-
its to third parties; and (2) an agent or trustee who establishes a deposit
account to facilitate a business arrangement with an insured bank to use the
proceeds of the account to fund a prearranged loan.
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posits include deposits acquired through a mediator and deposits on
which an interest rate "significantly higher" than prevailing rates on sim-
ilar deposits in the same market area is offered. 7 5 FIRREA generally
prohibits brokered deposits, unless the FDIC grants special permission to
engage in such activity.1 7 6 If the FDIC considers a savings association
undercapitalized, it is unlikely to allow a savings association to accept
certain brokered deposits.17 7 However, a savings association may apply
to the FDIC for a waiver of the ban on brokered deposits.7 A waiver
may be granted if the FDIC determines that a savings association's use of
brokered deposits does not constitute an unsafe and unsound practice
and the waiver is necessary to maintain the savings association's liquidity
or to restructure its debt.179 The FDIC will not grant a waiver, however,
if allowing the savings association to accept brokered deposits will permit
the savings association to grow in asset size.180
FIRREA exempts a savings association that is under conservatorship
or receivership of the FDIC or RTC from this prohibition on brokered
deposits, provided that the acceptance, renewal or rollover of the
brokered deposit is not considered unsafe and unsound."' All savings
associations under conservatorship or receivership are deemed to pass
this test.182
C. Special Powers
"The interests of the American taxpayer demand an expedited resolu-
tion to the monumental problems involved with the unprecedented costs
of dealing with hundreds of insolvent thrifts and the orderly disposition
of the assets of these failed institutions." '83 To accomplish this, FIR-
FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 356 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 49
Fed. Reg. 13,010, 13,011) (emphasis omitted). The FDIC's concern over the use of
brokered deposits was that
[D]eposit-placement practices enable virtually all institutions to attract large
volumes of funds from outside their natural market area irrespective of the in-
stitutions' managerial and financial characteristics. The ability to obtain de
facto one-hundred-percent deposit insurance through the parceling of funds
eliminates the need for the depositor to analyze institutions' likelihood of con-
tinued financial viability.
Id. at 355 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 50,339, 50,340).
175. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 224(a)(f)(1)(A), 103 Stat. at 274 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a)(f)(1)(A)).
176. See id., § 224(a), 103 Stat. at 273 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a))
(brokered deposits prohibited after Dec. 7, 1989).
177. See id.
178. See id., § 224(a), 103 Stat. at 273 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a)(29)(c)).
179. Deposits are classified as liabilities on a bank balance sheet.
180. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 224(a), 103 Stat. at 273 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 183 lf(a)(29)(c)).
181. See id., § 224(c), 103 Stat. at 273 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(c)).
182. See Underfunded Institutions Get 60 More Days to Accept Brokered Deposits,
FDIC Decides, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 875 (Dec. 11, 1989).
183. House Report No. 54, supra note 3, at 308, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, at 104.
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REA expands the powers of the FDIC as conservator and receiver for
SAIF-member institutions in default."' In order to carry out the objec-
tive of providing for the efficient resolution of savings association fail-
ures, the FDIC is required to reevaluate the FHLBB's 1988 savings
association transactions and to renegotiate agreements where more
favorable terms to the federal government and taxpayers can be ob-
tained.1 " The FHLBB's savings association transactions have been
highly criticized for practically giving away failed savings associations to
acquirers, while billing taxpayers for billions in federal subsidies.1 86
Confusion over the FDIC's receivership powers since the passage of
FIRREA has generated a number of cases.' 87 The courts, however, have
clearly found that under FIRREA the FDIC inherits the role and the
powers of the FSLIC for purposes of receivership. In FDIC v. Gillard,'s
which was decided after FIRREA's passage, the FDIC moved to change
its designation from manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund for Empire
Savings and Loan Association to receiver for that institution. 189
Although admitting that "FIRREA is not a model of clarity in this re-
gard," the court held that the FDIC succeeded to the rights of the
FSLIC as receiver after FIRREA. 9' The court also found that FIR-
REA gave the FDIC the responsibility for the day-to-day operations of
184. See Mitchell, The New Savings and Loan Bailout Bill, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 1989, at
6, col. 5. See generally, FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212, 103 Stat. at 222 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1821) (conservatorship and receivership powers of the Federal regulators).
185. See $4.6 Billion in Assistance Given in 1989 to Thrifts Sold by FHLBB in 1988
Deals, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 299 (Aug. 20, 1990).
The government last year paid out $4.6 billion in federal assistance to ac-
quirers of thrifts under controversial transactions the former [FHLBB] ar-
ranged in 1988, according to data the [FDIC] recently provided to the House
Banking Committee.
According to the FDIC division that oversees operations of the former
[FSLIC], $3.5 billion of that total went to acquirers of thrifts under the
FHLBB's controversial Southwest Plan to resolve troubled S&Ls in that region.
And $1.2 billion of the $3.5 billion went to acquirers who completed their deals
in December 1988, shortly before certain key tax law provisions that made the
thrift deals attractive to investors were set to expire.
Id.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Johnson & Cravens,
889 F.2d 571, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1989) (FDIC controls former FSLIC Resolution Fund
cases); Triland Inv. Group v. FDIC, 735 F. Supp. 698, 699-700 & n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(there would be no successor to the FSLIC for institutions placed into receivership prior
to FIRREA's enactment if FDIC did not succeed to power, thus, where pre-Act creditor
would have received nothing had association been liquidated, creditor has no claim
against FDIC as FSLIC's successor); FSLIC v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land Assoc., 787
S.W.2d 475, 480 (rex. Ct. App. 1990) (the FDIC succeeds to the FSLIC as manager of
the FSLIC Resolution Fund because savings association closed prior to January 1, 1989).
188. 740 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
189. See id. at 427.
190. See id. at 428.
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the RTC' and compelled the FDIC to perform all of the RTC's
responsibilities." 2
If appointed conservator or receiver by the OTS, the FDIC may trans-
fer the savings association's assets or liabilities or merge the troubled or
failed savings association into another insured depository institution. 93
The FDIC's power selectively to transfer the liabilities of an insolvent
savings association to a healthy institution has been questioned. 194
The FDIC's ratable treatment of creditors195 may also be problematic
because of the extent of the FDIC's discretion in this area and the result-
ing potential for unequal treatment of creditors. 96
FIRREA now grants to the FDIC as receiver the power to make addi-
tional payments in its discretion to certain creditors from its own re-
sources without becoming obligated to make payments to any other
claimant or category of claimants. Thus, the FDIC now has the power
to select those obligations to creditors that it will assume and those
obligations that it will reject. 197
In addition, FIRREA confirmed the FDIC's authority to organize
new national savings associations to perform the functions of defaulted
savings associations'98 in order to reduce the impact of the financial loss
on the community.'9 9 Similarly, FIRREA gave the FDIC the power to
organize "bridge banks" to assume the deposits of a failed savings associ-
ation temporarily until the savings association can be sold.2"° As conser-
vator or receiver, the FDIC can permit the merger of a savings
association with any other savings association or bank without the ap-
proval of other federal banking agencies.20 '
191. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(b)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1)(C)).
192. See id.; FDIC v. Gillard, 740 F. Supp. 427, 428 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Note, The
Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and The S&L Crisis, supra note 24, at
S343.
193. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(d)(2)(G), 103 Stat. at 226-27 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)).
194. See Lobbying Efforts Helped Lessen Impact of FIRREA's Cross-Guarantee Provi-
sions, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 261 (Aug. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Lobbying
Efforts].
195. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(d)(4), 103 Stat. at 227 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(4)) (rulemaking authority relating to determination of claims).
196. Cf. First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1372 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Pre-FIRREA case holding that FDIC treatment of certain creditors was not ratable
under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 194).
197. Mitchell, The New Savings and Loan Bailout Bill, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 1989, at 6,
col. 6.
198. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 213(m), 103 Stat. at 243 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(1)(m)).
199. See id., § 212(a)(h), 103 Stat. at 242 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(h)); Mal-
loy, supra note 12, at 1139.
200. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 214(n), 103 Stat. at 246 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(n)); Malloy, supra note 12, at 1139-40.
201. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(a)(c)(2)(C), 103 Stat. at 222 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(C)); Description, Effects and Implications, supra note 27, at 7.
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FIRREA also created an emergency provision that authorized the
FDIC "to arrange an assisted acquisition of a troubled savings associa-
tion by another savings association, a [bank holding company], or a sav-
ings association holding company 'notwithstanding any provision of state
law.' "202 This provision has called into question the FDIC's power to
override state bank-branching laws.203 FIRREA seems to allow the ac-
quirer to maintain and operate the acquired savings association branches
contrary to state law, or, in the alternative, to treat the acquired savings
association as a separate entity and open new branches within the same
state.' 4 One recent case, Arkansas Bank Commissioner v. Resolution
Trust Corporation,2"5 ruled in favor of the federal regulators on this is-
sue,2' but a number of other courts have ruled against the federal regu-
lators' powers to preempt state branching laws.207
FIRREA gives further resolution powers to the FDIC with its "cross-
guarantee" provision." "As originally advanced by President Bush...
FIRREA would have provided the [FDIC] with far-reaching authority
to hold depository institutions within a holding company structure liable
for losses incurred by the insurance fund because of an affiliated institu-
tion's default."2 '9 Lobbyists and regulators, concerned that such a strin-
gent provision would discourage acquisitions of failed or failing savings
202. Developments in Banking: 1989, 9 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 26 (1990) (quoting FIR-
REA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217(8)(k)(1)(A)(i), 103 Stat. 183, 258 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(k))); see Malloy, Seeing the Light Savings Association Conversions After
FIRREA, 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. - (1991) (forthcoming).
203. See Arkansas Bank Comm'r. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.
1990).
204. See FIRREAsupra note 1, § 217(8)(k)(1)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 258 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1823(k)(1)(A)(i)).
205. 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
206. See id. at 170.
207. See id at 176-77 (Heany, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which decisions of the
Comptroller conflicting with state bank branching laws have been overruled).
208. FIRREA's "cross-guarantee" provision has received attention. See Glass, Cross-
Guarantee is Seen as Risk to Holding Companies, Am. Banker, July 19, 1990, at 19, col. 1;
Lobbying Efforts, supra note 194, at 261. The provision can be interpreted as authorizing
the FDIC to cover the losses of a troubled or failed "commonly controlled" savings asso-
ciation with the assets of a healthy "sister." See generally FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 212(a)(d)(2), 103 Stat. at 225-27 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)) (describing
the broad general powers of FDIC as conservator and receiver).
As parent, a bank-holding company by statute is not subjected to the cross-guarantee
provision, which its subsidiaries are. It is nevertheless affected by the provision because
the FDIC's claims against the failed subsidiary are superior to those of the parent. See
FIRREA, supra note I, § 212(a)(d)(4),(5), 103 Stat. at 227-28 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(4),(5)). Although the cross-guarantee authority may save the FDIC money
that would otherwise have come out of the insurance fund, the constitutionality of forcing
a healthy affiliate to cover losses of a sick affiliate and thus driving the healthy "sister"
into insolvency has been questioned. See Glass, supra, at 25, col. 2; Note, A Note to
Congress and the FDIC: After FIRREA, Where's the BiF7, supra note 43, at S449. There
is a five-year exemption for insured institutions that acquired troubled savings associa-
tions prior to FIRREA.
209. Lobbying Efforts, supra note 194, at 261.
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associations, however, amended the original law to soften its blow.21
These amendments include a five-year exemption from the cross-guaran-
tee provision,211 and the possibility of FDIC exemption from the provi-
sion if the FDIC determines it is in the SAIF's best interests.212
CONCLUSION
Two years after its enactment, FIRREA's impact on the savings asso-
ciation industry is still not entirely clear. FIRREA's quick passage, only
six months after the bill was proposed, insured that technical glitches in
the language of the Act, especially with regard to the FDIC's powers
over insolvent savings associations, would create problems. Meanwhile,
despite the substantially enhanced powers of the FDIC under FIRREA
with respect to savings associations, the SAIF's zero-balance, combined
with Congress' unwillingness to commit sufficient funds to the bailout
effort, effectively renders the FDIC's resolution powers moot.
In a strained economy, FIRREA's requiring weakened savings as-
sociations to meet more stringent minimum capital requirements and to
pay higher insurance premiums will increase the likelihood of savings
association insolvency, rather than create more efficient management of
savings association failures. The FDIC will continue to face complex
decisions regarding the costs and benefits of providing open-thrift assist-
ance versus liquidating insolvent savings associations. FIRREA gives
the FDIC sweeping discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis how to
handle insolvencies, but such broad discretion does not make the results
easy to predict. Keeping an insolvent savings association alive with the
objective of curing its financial condition may increase its ultimate losses,
causing the "resolution" to be more costly to the FDIC than it would
have been had the FDIC allowed it to fail. Added to the complexity of
the cost equation is the pressure of inadequate funding for the resolution
process. These problems may necessitate new savings association laws
that give the FDIC more specific guidance with regard to resolution
procedures.
Anne M. Taylor
210. See id.
211. See supra note 208.
212. See Lobbying Efforts, supra note 194, at 262.
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